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Addiction is a person-level phenomenon that involves twin normative failures. A failure of
normal rational effective agency or self-control with respect to the substance; and shame
at both this failure, and the failure to live up to the standards for a good life that the addict
himself acknowledges and aspires to. Feeling shame for addiction is not a mistake. It is
part of the shape of addiction, part of the normal phenomenology of addiction, and often a
source of motivation for the addict to heal. Like other recent attempts in the addiction liter-
ature to return normative concepts such as “choice” and “responsibility” to their rightful
place in understanding and treating addiction, the twin normative failure model is fully com-
patible with investigation of genetic and neuroscientific causes of addiction. Furthermore,
the model does not re-moralize addiction. There can be shame without blame.
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“Dear friends, be men; let shame be in your hearts . . .Among
men who feel shame, more are saved than die.” Ajax to his
troops in Homer’s Illiad
THE TWIN NORMATIVE FAILURE MODEL OF ADDICTION
I propose a twin normative failure model of addiction in which
the self-regarding reactive attitudes of bewilderment, disappoint-
ment, and shame play a constitutive role1. The addict cannot
pass her own survey because she self-interprets, and self-interprets
correctly, that she fails to execute normal powers of effective ratio-
nal agency, she decides not to use and uses; she also fails to live
up to the hopes, expectations, standards, and ideals she has for
a good life for herself because of her addiction. It is possible
and desirable to understand addiction as a normative failing in
both these respects, one of rational effective agency, the second of
moral quality broadly construed, without also moralizing addic-
tion. Recognition of these twin normative failures is a powerful
source of desperation and motivation to heal on the part of the
addict and an immensely valuable tool for the therapeutic com-
munity to keep in view and use non-moralistically, as it tries help
the addict to heal. In earlier times, it may have been that most
addicts died for reasons related to addiction. Now, perhaps, with
much deeper knowledge of the causes, components, effects, and
nature of addiction we can make Ajax’s maxim true for addicts:
“Among men who feel shame, more are saved than die.”
I intend the twin moral failure analysis to be true to the perspec-
tive of the addict, his close relations, as well as from the perspective
of the professional and non-professional therapeutic communities
that work and live with addicts. I also intend the analysis to describe
normal and reliable features of addiction. The exceptions, the cases
where there is no shame on the part of the addict descriptively, and
where shame would be unwarranted normatively involve abnor-
mal psychiatric conditions, e.g., schizoid personality disorder,
1I mean the view to apply in the first instance to alcohol, cocaine, and opiate
addiction.
or unusual social conditions where there are no choice-worthy
options for a good human life, or where the addict has a certain
social status, social permission (opiate addicts in hospice), and/or
financial resources to be an addict with impunity.
To many, the view will seem too strong in two respects. First,
some addicts are willing and not ashamed, so the view is descrip-
tively false. Second, the view is reactionary: despite my claim
that the twin normative failure model does not moralize addic-
tion because it acknowledges shame without endorsing blame, it
nonetheless returns us to the view that addiction is a moral failing.
After spelling out the view more fully, I reply to these and several
other objections.
ADDICTION IS A NORMATIVE DISORDER
In a seminal paper in philosophy and cognitive science, “Inten-
tional Systems,” Dennett (1) distinguished between three stances
we commonly take toward ourselves and other human beings, the
“intentional stance,” the “design stance,” and the “physical stance.”
From the perspective of the intentional stance we deploy psycho-
logical or mental vocabulary to describe, explain, and predict our
own mental states and actions and those of others. We think of
ourselves and our fellows as “intentional systems,” as human indi-
viduals chock full of beliefs, desires, emotions, and goals. And
we think of a particular integrated suite of embodied intentional
states and dispositions as what makes an individual tick, what
makes them who they are, what’s behind the personality and char-
acter they display. The design stance goes below the intentional or
person level and uses concepts related to normal or proper func-
tion: drinking a cup of coffee involves a perceptual system that
registers that there is a cup of coffee, a system that computes desire
and eventuates in a decision to drink it, which sends a signal to
the motor system to move the hand in the right way, lift-to-lips,
and drink. The physical stance goes lower still to the level of actual
physical realization. The physical stance is especially useful when
there is breakdown of proper function: Ann drinks coffee through
a straw because in the bike accident she badly sprained both wrists.
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Higher levels depend upon and are implemented by the lower
levels. One could take the physical stance description lower: sprains
are implemented on wrists, specifically on ligaments, which are
made of flesh, which is eventually, like everything else, imple-
mented on bosons and fermions2. But higher levels also have
emergent properties in one perfectly natural sense. Wiffle balls
are round, but the molecules that compose them are not. A hard
hit wiffle ball can cause a bruise, but a hard hit polymer atom in a
wiffle ball cannot cause a bruise. Wholes have properties that their
parts don’t. So too persons have properties that their parts, brain
parts, and gene parts do not. Addiction is a person-level phenom-
enon. Neither brains nor genes are the sole cause of addiction;
nor do brains or genes become addicted. That said genetic and
neural malfunctions are clearly an important part of the expla-
nation of how and why some people, some intentional systems,
become addicts and suffer addiction.
At the intentional stance level, but not at lower levels, persons,
whole persons, are normative creatures in two senses, one con-
stituted by our power to assess or evaluate ourselves as rational
or reason-responsive agents in a broad sense and to do what we
decide is best to do all things considered; the other constituted by
our power to assess or evaluate ourselves morally or from a moral
point of view. Normative governance consists of two complex and
highly interactive capacities, rational governance and moral gov-
ernance. Rational governance refers to the capacity of persons to
determine what we have reason to do, what makes sense to do given
our aims, interests, and the way(s) the world is. Moral governance
is the capacity to judge some of the things we do (or intend to do)
as good or bad, right or wrong.
Our power to assess or evaluate ourselves as rational or reason-
responsive agents is both episodic and diachronic. Episodically, at
any one time or period in a life, there is always a set of possibly
true answers to two sorts of questions. One set concerns what a
person is doing here and now (at this time or within this period of
time); the other set concerns why the person is doing it. As to the
question of what I myself am doing, suppose what I am doing here
and now is driving my car through the Holland Tunnel from Man-
hattan to New Jersey. As to why, the reason is that I believe that for
someone in my physical position, in lower Manhattan, with a car,
and wanting to get to Jersey, the best or most convenient way to get
to Jersey is to take the Holland Tunnel. My physical position and
my desire to get to Jersey give me good reason to drive through the
Tunnel. I am responding to that reason in driving through the Tun-
nel. Normally, when a person has reason toΦ, sheΦ’s. Addicts are
puzzling including to themselves. When it comes to their drug of
2According to Dennett’s pragmatic taxonomy, the “intentional stance” is person-
level psychology; the “design stance” is computational cognitive psychology, and the
“physical stance” is neuroscience. One could, for pragmatic reasons and perfectly
in the spirit of his taxonomy go higher than the intentional stance – to sociology
and then anthropology – and lower that his physical stance, to biochemistry and
eventually to basic physics. One my view, but possibly not on Dennett’s (he is well-
known for his instrumentalist or eliminativist tendencies), the higher-level entities
truly have properties that the lower levels don’t have. There really are such things
as beliefs and desires. People have beliefs and desires; people contain brains and
brains contain neurons; but neurons don’t have brains and brains aren’t people, and
probably brains do not have beliefs and desire, although people with brains do, and
so on.
choice (DOC), what David Foster Wallace types as“the Substance,”
they are performatively inconsistent (2). They resolve not to use
and use. Many addicts report that the resolve and the action that
undermines it occur at the same time, virtually in the same instant.
Our lives are also lived and led in diachronic psychological
space and not just in the moment or in brief episodes. We expe-
rience ourselves as someone who was there in the past and we
conceive ourselves as someone who will be there in the further
future, short-term and long-term. We experience ourselves as not
just being alive, but as having a life to lead, self-direct, or con-
trol, where a life is conceived as “the sum of one’s aspirations,
decisions, activities, projects, and human relationships” [(3), p.
5]. Most of us probably do not have a blueprint for our whole
life, what Rawls (4) called a “life plan,” but we do have for our-
selves multifarious projects and plans nested together in various,
possibly ever-adjusting, relations of priority and expansiveness.
For many, most, perhaps all of us persons, we develop a narrative
self-interpretation of ourselves as persons and perpetually evalu-
ate how well we are doing in becoming who we aim to be and in
accomplishing what we aim to accomplish. A basic way in which
to understand the inter-relationships between our past, present,
and future is to conceive of the lives we lead “as an unfolding
story” (5, 6)3. There comes a time in every addict’s life when he
comes to see that his “self-represented identity” and his “actual
full identity” are on divergent paths, likely far apart, possibly
inconsistent (7)4.
Finally, our lives are lived in social space as gregarious social
animals. Most humans have natural desires for companionship
and most of us recognize, even if only inchoately, that we cannot
survive, develop ourselves as persons, or live good lives, that is,
lives which are happy as well as meaningful and fulfilling, with-
out situating ourselves in complex socio-moral relationships with
other persons. And despite wide cultural variation in the exact
norms governing social practices we all typically engage in nor-
matively governed practices of “lending and borrowing, promising
and consenting, buying and selling, making friends, entering into
marriage, establishing a family, offering and accepting aid, and
so forth” [(8), 20]. Reliably gaining the goods associated with
these practices – security, self-esteem, self-respect, social trust,
friendship – involve broadly moral evaluation diachronically by
oneself and others5.
3I don’t mean to overstate the degree to which people do or ought to examine and
evaluate their lives from an articulate reflective pose (see Flanagan (33), for a cri-
tique of Charles Taylor for this intellectualist mistake). The point is that people have
ideals, ends, goals, and purposes – many of which are socially scripted – and we
are consciously or semi-consciously aware of how we are doing in relation to these
ideals, ends, goals, and purposes. There are rational evaluations and adjustments of
both ends and means along the way, as well as all the familiar kinds of rationalization
and defensive denial that one really wanted to do such and so, or be such and so in
the first place.
4“Self-represented identity” is the story from the first-person point of view; “actual
full identity” is the true story of who one is, what one is like, the story that would be
told by an ideal observer with the right theory of the human mind and action and
knowledge of all the facts.
5I need to emphasize the idea that evaluation occurs “in broadly moral terms.” Later,
following Williams (34), I distinguish between “morality, the peculiar institution,”
which is roughly the kind picked out as “moral” inside the Abrahamic traditions
and “the ethical,” which is much broader and includes the aspirations to live well
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This picture of levels of explanation and of persons as nor-
mative beings in the twin – rational self-interpretation and
self-control sense, what I call, the “rational effective agency sense”,
and “the moral sense” – has implications for thinking realisti-
cally and humanely about addiction. Addiction is a person-level
disorder – actually a person-in-a-particular-social-world disor-
der – in which there is failure of normative governance by rational
norms of narrative or biographical integration and moral norms.
The result is first bewilderment on the part of the agent that
she has lost some of her normal capacities to direct her behav-
ior by what she judges as her considered desires and reasons
(for example, to drink like a normal person; not to drink to
blackout), and eventually deep shame, as well as a host of other
reactive attitudes, at the fact that she is not doing well by her
own and often widely shared standards6. The model of addiction,
the “twin normative failure model,” and of the addict, I propose
rejects reductive models of addiction that claim that addiction
is a design or physical level disorder. Addiction occurs in crea-
tures with brains and genes (and bosons and fermions) but it
is not a disorder of brains and genes (or bosons and fermions).
It might involve disorders of either or both (9–11)7. Persons are
addicts. Addiction is a person-level disorder, a diachronic intra-
personal and inter-personal disorder; it is a disorder of persons
that involves normally and reliably shame in one’s own eyes,
and thus losses of self-respect and self-esteem, as well as social
shame, a sense that even if one is not actually seen for who
and how one is by others, one would be judged weak, weird,
undisciplined, untrustworthy, and scary if one were seen for
how one is as a person-in-the-grip of an addictive behavior pat-
tern. Addiction fully engages the reactive attitudes of the addict,
even if neither he, nor his community, judges him harshly or
moralistically8.
by achieving maximal intersection of the goods that comprise what is true, beauti-
ful, and good. I intend what I am calling “moral” and what constitutes “the moral
failing” of the addict to align with “the ethical” and not with “morality, the peculiar
institution.”
6The Big Book of AA describes the relevant first-person phenomenology as
“incomprehensible demoralization (p. 30).”
7I am collaborating on a project with geneticists (31) who find that in mice, cocaine
and opioid use activates genes associated with the salt and water instincts. The
instincts to maximize salt and water intake when these are present and the organism
needs them, are clearly adaptations, perhaps in exactly the form that leads some,
but by no means all mice (29, 30) to become addicted mice. The addiction that
piggybacks on these instincts is not an adaptation; it was not selected for in the
original evolutionary environment or in recent ones to serve a fitness-enhancing
effect. Liedtke thinks that this gene-level activity may be what at the genetic level
subserves what some neuroscientists call the “midbrain mutiny” that involves the
“hijacking” of normal reasons-responsiveness and control capacities by unusual
schedules of reinforcement (35), or by an unwelcomed disassociation of the
normally coordinated brain based “liking-wanting” systems (36), or by exhaustion
of the brain’s mental muscle, aka, “willpower” (37), or by stress hypersensitivity
(38). This gene-level explanation of higher order brain level processes that subserve
addiction, which itself rests on an evolutionary explanation of selection of genes
that code for salt and water instinct, and (45) one of these higher order brain
explanations can both be true as far as what happens at the gene level and the brain
level without even the combined resources of both levels remotely describing or
explaining addiction at the person level.
8“The reactive attitudes” according to Strawson (18) are the set of familiar senti-
ments, emotions, or attitudes such as anger, guilt, shame, forgiveness, resentment,
happiness, and gratitude that regulate human interaction.
One consequence of my view of addiction and its relationship to
the experience of being an addict is that it accepts rather than resists
the idea that addiction really is, in the eyes of the addict, and those
with whom she is in community, a normative problem. The addict
has trouble with respect to her addiction putting her reasons, her
best thinking, in reliable control of her actions, and she has trouble
(perhaps for this reason) abiding by the moral norms upon which
her sense of her own integrity and self-worth turns. It is disrespect-
ful to the phenomenon of addiction, to addicts who experience
their addiction as involving these twin normative failings, and to
the wider community, which judges addiction as bewildering, sad,
and shameful to deny that it is a straightforward normative dis-
order. It is equally extremely shortsighted and inhumane to think
that the problem that an addict has is a straightforward problem
that can be solved by a psychopharmacological intervention to
stop the desire to use or the effects of using. What most don’t see
because of the meager dialectical offerings – addiction is either a
moral or a brain/gene disorder – is the prospect that one can see
addiction as involving biographically interpretative assessment of
one’s own reason responsiveness failings as well as moral failings
without either the addict herself or her community moralizing
and blaming her. The theory is that at the level of persons, social
persons, addiction is a failure in two highly interactive normative
systems at once. One can think this, just as one can think that
addiction involves some choice and some responsibility without
blaming the addict and moralizing addiction. Let me explain.
DSM 5 ON SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND ADDICTIVE DISORDERS
Technically DSM 5, (12) like its predecessors, is only a diagnos-
tic manual. It offers a classificatory scheme. DSM 5 taxonomizes
and conceptually disciplines disorder. It doesn’t claim to explain
(indeed it positively refuses to provide etiologies), or to offer treat-
ment or therapeutic regimens. What DSM 5 is not agnostic about
is that the symptom cluster it uses to diagnose substance-related
disorders will yield to neuro-specification9. The manual is full of
strong hints that it expects its symptom clusters to be filled in by
neuro-specifics. We learn that all drugs of abuse have in common
“direct activation of the brain reward system;” that people with
“impairments of brain inhibitory mechanisms may be particu-
larly predisposed to develop substance use disorders.” The section
on substance abuse disorders, like the rest of DSM 5, is filled with
“maybes” about connections to genes and the brain. The facts
are that there must be such connections; humans are genetically
endowed animals and our nervous systems are involved in every-
thing we do. But it is a mistake to think that all properties of
persons reduce to properties of parts, even especially important
parts. I could argue that all the winks and nods to neuroscience
9Insell (39) the head of NIMH is impatient about filling in the details, and wants to
push on to the neuro-specifications of all bona fide mental disorders quickly. And
he is willing to put the money he controls as head of NIMH where his mouth is
Meanwhile, Frances (40) former head of the DSM IV taskforce laments the rush to
neuroscientific reduction because neuroscience is immature, and because, like me,
he is skeptical that all mental disorders are brain disorders, and third because he
worries about the dominance of money in seeking neuro-pharmacological “cures”
for problems that either are not in the brain at all or, even if they have a brain
dysfunction component, are mostly psychosocial problems.
www.frontiersin.org October 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 120 | 3
Flanagan The shame of addiction
(and to a lesser extent, to genetics) is part of the mindless cul-
tural spread of neuro-enthusiasm (and what Rob Wilson calls
“smallism”), which although true, would distract from my aim
to describe what addiction is in a way that is true to the phenom-
enon and that is also therapeutically useful, recognizing the many
roles that shame and related reactive attitudes can and do play in
healing from addiction.
It is also a mistake – a related one – to think that all the
essential features of addiction are features that can be revealed in
non-human animal models of addiction. The brain reward system
of non-human animals has interesting similarities to the human
reward system, but the social ecologies of mice and humans are
entirely different, as are the capacities served by culture and an
enormous prefrontal cortex. A rodent cannot consciously resolve,
possibly in consultation with fellow mice, to refrain from consum-
ing a drug because its life is not going well, because it is causing
communal harm. A rodent cannot relapse, and then regret and feel
ashamed or guilty for its failure to maintain abstinence. Animal
models may teach us about how dangerous and imprudent it can
be to suddenly reverse preferences over time, but the full character
of human addiction is no mere preference reversal or oscillation.
It normally involves an interpretation and evaluation of oneself as
having let oneself down; of having broken promises to one’s own
self (and others). Non-human animals, at least the ones studied
in addiction labs, are not self-interpretatively normed. They don’t
see themselves as leading a life. Nor are they moved by thoughts
of what counts as a good person/rodent, nor puzzled or disturbed
by feelings of guilt, shame, and embarrassment. The moral virtue
or value of self-control and of responsibility for self is irrelevant
to animal addiction. But with a human being, a person’s social
relationships, the effects of his actions on others, his loyalties and
friendships, his trustworthiness, are deeply relevant to his being
an addicted human being10.
What is really interesting is that the DSM 5 criteria for
substance-related and addictive disorders are very plausible and
never mention, not once, the brain or genes. What they do men-
tion, and rightly so, are normative impairments. Here is the list
of diagnostic criteria for alcohol-related disorders [(12), pp. 490–
491], which are representative of the substance abuses overall:
1. Alcohol is often taken in larger amounts or over a longer
period than was intended.
2. There is a persistent desire or unsuccessful efforts to cut down
or control alcohol use.
10Ahmed (29, 30) has done very important work inside the animal modeling tra-
dition emphasizing that most rats offered cocaine do not get addicted and, more
importantly for treating addiction, that compulsive cocaine use is lower in envi-
ronments where there are multiple pleasure-producing and choice-worthy options
besides the cocaine. My concern with animal models is not based on denial, not even
skepticism, that there are genetic and/or neurobiological components of addiction,
or on doubt that the brain might be the best place for interventionist strategies to
short circuit the desire to use, the compulsion to use, the effects of use, and so on. It
might be. The point is that even if the brain is an effective, even the most effective,
site of intervention, this is not evidence that addiction is a brain disorder or that it
is sensible or good to model it as such. Removing the battery of a car is an excellent
way to immobilize it, but a running car is not a battery phenomenon and is not well
modeled by the battery, what the battery is, does, and the ways it can malfunction.
See below on Woodward’s (32) model of causation for why this is so.
3. A great deal of time is spent in activities necessary to obtain
alcohol, use alcohol, or recover from its effects.
4. Craving, or a strong desire or urge to use alcohol.
5. Recurrent alcohol use resulting in a failure to fulfill major role
obligations at work, school, or home.
6. Continued alcohol use despite having persistent or recurrent
social or inter-personal problems caused or exacerbated by
the effects of alcohol.
7. Important social, occupational, or recreational activities are
given up or reduced because of alcohol use.
8. Recurrent alcohol use in situations in which it is physically
hazardous.
9. Alcohol use is continued despite knowledge of having a per-
sistent or recurrent physical or psychological problem that is
likely to have been caused or exacerbated by alcohol.
10. Tolerance, as defined by either of the following:
a. A need for markedly increased amounts of alcohol to
achieve intoxication or desired effect.
b. A markedly diminished effect with continued use of the
same amount of alcohol.
11. Withdrawal, as manifested by either of the following:
a. The characteristic withdrawal symptoms for alcohol (refer
to Criteria A and B of the criteria set for alcohol withdrawal,
pp. 499–500).
b. Alcohol (or a closely related substance, such as a benzodi-
azepine) is taken to relieve or avoid withdrawal symptoms.
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF ADDICTION
DSM is wisely explicit, despite the thick vein of neuro-enthusiasm
that courses through it, that substance abuse involves “impaired
control” and “social impairment.” The language it uses to depict
addiction is the language of the intentional stance. The addict has
trouble carrying out his “intentions” (1); he “desires” to control
using and makes“persistent efforts” to do so (2); he spends“a great
deal of time in activities necessary to obtain alcohol” (3); he has
“persistent and recurrent social and inter-personal problems” (4–
7). Understood in this way, it looks as if DSM 5 embeds something
in the vicinity of the twin normative failure model in its descrip-
tion of the typical cluster of features that define, characterize, or
constitute addiction.
But, truth be told, DSM 5 is unclear about whether it considers
these features merely symptomatic (often that seems the implica-
tion) the way fever is with a flu, or whether it understands these
features as constitutive, as necessary, or as part of the typical psy-
chological profile of addicts. For any mental disorder we can dis-
tinguish among its causes, its components or constituents, and its
consequences. Because humans are self-interpreting animals, clas-
sifications, components, and consequences are absorbed, recorded,
reflectively assessed, and they change the person being classified,
who as a consequence of his disorder and his comprehension of it
causes myriad further effects on himself and others. If one exam-
ines the vast literature comprised of memoirs of addiction (13)
as well as writings by therapists who work with addicts, most
every entry on the DSM 5 list will be familiar as constitutive of
addiction. When the addict feels shame before his own eyes, when
he observes his control failures, when he understands that he is
an addict not living up to his own standards or best interests,
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he changes, for better or worse. The story of who he is, what
he is like, how well he is doing in the task of accomplishing what he
intends, of living well, absorbs ever new material. There is narrative
self-interpretative adjustment. Since narrative is partly constitu-
tive of the self, he changes (7, 14). For the addict, along the descent
depicted by DSM 5 steps 1–11, he is bewildering to himself, pos-
sibly terrifying – he can’t get a grip – he’s a disaster, a train wreck
harming himself and those he loves. This first personal normative
assessment does really capture the shape, the texture, and the phe-
nomenology of addiction. Is there a mistake? No. Indeed, it is only
by understanding these normative failings that the addict shows
himself the self-respect he deserves as a person and leverages, nor-
mally with communal assistance, his remaining powers of agency
to get back on track and repair himself as well as the situations and
relations that have been damaged along the way.
Despite the fact that the DSM 5 list of symptoms includes
failures in self-control and in reliability – in behavioral failures
with respect to norms – it is missing any reference to normative
feeling states, to reactive attitudes associated with these behav-
ioral failures. The addict has “cravings,” and greater “tolerance”
involves changes in the “effects” of the DOC. He continues to use
despite“knowledge”that using causes him problems, etc. But there
is nothing in 1–11 about the way the addict experiences his fail-
ures to rationally effectively and morally guide his life through and
past the allure of alcohol, which consistently undermines, possibly
defeats his attempts to live well and to be well11. Interpreting the
DSM 5 criteria to include these reactive attitudes or extending its
11Contrast DSM 5 (12) with Graham’s (9) – what I call “the ignoble eightfold path
of addiction,” especially, (iii), (iv), and (vii) which emphasize the self-directed reac-
tive attitudes in addiction. DSM 5’s 1–11 speak about ways the addict fails to exert
various kinds of control despite his best efforts and it speaks about feelings toward
alcohol (craving, tolerance). I am emphasizing the addict’s feelings toward his SELF,
possibly as a result of these failures and the harm he does to himself and others.
And these reactive attitudes I claim, are part of what addiction is, and what needs
treatment. TWO CAVEATS: first, in (vi–viii) Graham places I think too much stock
in the belief that relapse is more or less inevitable. Second, I read (vi) as descriptive
not prescriptive. It is true that relapse powerfully engages recognition of the twin
normative failures including shame and its suite. Increased knowledge about addic-
tion, of course, teaches that despite the shame, the addict may not in any robust
sense be to blame or deserve blame.
(i) A person commences a behavior that is potentially harmful or deleterious.
They consume a deleterious drug or other chemical substance or gamble.
(ii) The behavior eventually becomes an object of focal attention and periodically
repeated or habitual activity. The focus is such that at times or in some cases
it may be “the only tune or story in the addict’s head, and nothing else drives
it out”.
(iii) The behavior produces consequences that are not just harmful or that seri-
ously risk harm to self (and/or to others) but are perceived as harmful or
destructive by the agent.
(iv) The perception or self-conscious experience of harmful consequences leads
the person on certain lucid, critical or self-reflective occasions to negatively
self-evaluate the behavior and attempt to refrain or quit. This does not mean
the addict knows how to quit or how difficult it may be to quit or whether
they can quit for any consistent period of time. But an attempt to refrain is
made.
(v) The addict refrains, quits or inhibits the behavior during certain periods (per-
haps without assistance, perhaps only with assistance – individual cases and
occasions vary).
(vi) Quitting or cessation ultimately (timing and intervals vary) proves unsuc-
cessful, however. The addict relapses. They “fall back” into the detrimental
criteria to include the feelings associated with the twin normative
failures it almost always involves, would capture better the psy-
chology of addiction than any purely behavioral, neuroscientific,
or genetic model.
THE INTERPRETATIVE, REASONS-RESPONSIVENESS,
EFFECTIVE AGENCY FAILURE
The twins that fail in addiction are fraternal, not identical. What I
call the interpretive, reasons-responsiveness, effective agency fail-
ure is really a set of failures that include cognitive mistakes such
as minimization (I don’t drink too much; I just need to stop at
n, where n> what a normal person would think is wise), and
rationalization (you’d drink a lot too if you had my _____). One
failure that is most familiar to both addicts and those in relation
to them is a failure to execute rational control, to be able to exe-
cute rational plans, the failure to be in charge. The simplest way to
put this point is in terms of the performative inconsistency men-
tioned earlier, which every addict understands as constitutive of
his situation: I will/decide/pledge/promise to myself (possibly to
others as well) that I will moderate or stop using; and then I use.
P and not P. The failure is one of effective agency, of leading one’s
life and not just tagging along for the addicted ride. The addict
like everyone else sees himself as a being with hopes, projects and
plans, responsibilities and obligations, friendships, and loves, as an
historical, enduring being, possessed of long-range interests. But
his own defective agency gums up the works, the work of being and
becoming the person he aims to be. He fails at reliably enacting
in-charge selfhood. If his DOC, the Substance, is available he loses
normal self-control against getting lost in a preference oscillating
and the preference-reversing moment or episode. He is bewildered
and ashamed.
According to DSM 5, this sort of complex failure begins in mild
addiction at step 1, where the substance abuser uses more that he
at first intends. And it gets worse as the problem becomes more
severe. It is sometimes hard to tell from behavior where exactly
a drinker is in terms of loss of the ability to stop in a normal
reasons-responsive way, i.e., by making an all things/future me
considered judgment that they should moderate or stop, and then
doing so. The Big Book of AA written in 1939, not a scientific work,
recognizes correctly a certain kind of “heavy drinker,” who if he
has reason to stop (the liver, the job, the spouse) stops. And much
recent work confirms that many people who drink heavily, possi-
bly in binges, possibly regularly, at some point, in their lives stop
(15, 16, 43). But there is a type of drinker who seems not to be
like this. They try to stop but can’t. Caroline Knapp’s, Drinking: A
behavior after a period of temporary stoppage. The behavior returns together
with its negative consequences or risks.
(vii) Relapse is interpreted by the agent as a form of personal disappointment
or failure, not just as something destructive or risky, but as a source of
shame, regret, self-blame, and embarrassment or as grounds for diminished
self-confidence or self-esteem.
(viii) The steps or phases of harmful behavior, temporary abstention, and relapse
cycle repeatedly. The recycling, in some cases, may cease permanently, per-
haps without harmful long-term residue. And the person just plain quits.
(Thousands of addicts just plain quit for good at some point. They “age out”
of their addiction.) Or the addictive pattern may lead to an addict.s enduring
exposure to harm or personal demise.
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Love Story, Pete Hamill’s, A Drinking Life, and Charles Jackson’s,
The Lost Weekend are powerful depiction of such lives.
The brain basis of addiction, according to animal studies, lies,
in significant part, in the mesolimbic dopamine and brain reward
system. It is possible that this area is compromised in humans, not
only in opiate addiction, but in alcoholism as well. Suppose it is,
and that therefore a compromised mesolimbic reward system is a
necessary condition of human addiction. It does not follow that it
is sufficient or that it is the only necessary condition (42, 44). In
humans, addiction is constituted not only by craving, compulsive
use, and “jonesing” for the Substance, which may be subserved
primarily by the compromised mesolimbic reward system, it is
also experienced and treated just in case the person experiences
herself as unable to stop given that she has reason to (the personal
and social costs mentioned in DSM 5); and that she is ashamed
that she is not able to live as she judges to be good. This sort
of self-regarding reactive attitude is I claim is a normal part of
the phenomenology of addiction but not mentioned in DSM 5.
It is implausible that human beings control against consumption
impulsivity and imprudent preference reversal only by virtue of
some sort of inhibitory mechanism in the brain reward system. If
they did, then it might be plausible to say that addiction represents
a disorder of that mechanism, and of nothing else. But human
sources of inhibition and self-control are known to be many and
various. Human powers of deliberation, self-assessment, and rea-
son responsiveness are subserved by neural systems, especially in
prefrontal cortex, that differ in organizational complexity from
those of rodents. Furthermore, human linguistic capacities put us
in unusual touch with communal norms and with communal rea-
sons for abiding by those norms. To be sure, the addict has trouble
making her reasons effective and this may have to do with damage
to the circuitry in the mesolimbic areas or in the areas that connect
prefrontal cortex to lower regions. But the facts are that addict has
her reasons to stop, wishes to stop, but can’t. And it is this expe-
rience of the failure to execute effective agency, according to my
argument, that is also constitutive of human addiction, although
almost certainly not of rodent addiction12. A human addict can-
not in a situation in which he is considering if he can and should
refrain from drug consumption, regard himself “as waiting to dis-
cover or to observe in which direction he will be moved” [(17), p.
51]. To be counted by him as a decision of whether or not to refrain,
the state of deciding must be thought to conform to some stan-
dard of possessing a good reason. The question “Will I abstain?”
is unavoidably indistinguishable from “should I abstain here and
now?” The total situation I am in as an addict confronts me, and
sets the problem. I may try to take account of things about myself
that I believe are not in my power to change (because I lack the
means or skill to change) and those things I believe I can change.
The anxiety, felt need, impulse, the craving, the sudden passion to
consume, when they occur, may feel like something that descends
upon me. I may try to double back upon myself and think of myself
as something more, or less, than I really am. “Can I, or can I not,
free myself of this behavior?”“Perhaps I can.” But the fact is: there
12One can, of course, make a rodent a psychological mess, extremely anxious, fear-
ful, and so on, by mixing reinforcement schedules that both encourage and inhibit
addiction.
are normative elements in states of mind and types of conduct
relevant to being an addict, and these normative elements cannot
be reframed in the descriptions of neural inhibitory mechanisms
operating in independence of a person’s own self-assessment and
biographically reflective reason responsiveness. The key for the
addict is to find some way – often with professional help or non-
professional communal help – to leverage his remaining powers of
agency, first and foremost in relation to his DOC, to stop using the
Substance. Sometimes the first choice is to be tied like Ulysses to
the mast for a time. But it is an important but underestimated fact
that every addict who does not use any longer has done exactly that,
moderated or stopped using (15, 16, 43). Such former addicts have
rediscovered, reclaimed effective agency. And they are abundant.
THE MORAL FAILURE
Persons enter the world valuing certain things and not others and
they exit the same way. We are creatures with ends. Some of these
have to do with resource needs and acquisitive desires related to
these needs – for food, clothing, and shelter; others have to do
with social needs, with needs for company and affection. We are
gregarious animals. No person, no matter what her conception
of flourishing or well-being would choose a life without friends,
says Aristotle13. When Strawson (18) calls attention to the reactive
attitudes, the suite of emotions and sentiments that guide inter-
personal commerce and that involve reactions to the good will, ill
will, and indifference of others, he is careful to include affection,
love, gratitude, and forgiveness, along with anger, resentment, and
shame. According to Strawson, these emotional dispositions come
with the equipment. He compares the reactive attitudes to induc-
tion. We cannot ask whether induction is rational. It is arational,
part of our animal nature, not something we can give up. What
we can do, however, in both the case of induction and the case of
the suite of reactive attitudes is to adjust, moderate, modify, tune
up and/or tune down as necessary both natural innate attitudes.
We modify our original disposition to apply the straight rule of
induction via feedback from its application. For example, when
we apply the straight rule to small or unrepresentative samples
we get poor predictions and we adjust the rule14. Eventually over
world historical time, the methods of inductive logic, statistics, and
probability theory develop. With respect to the reactive emotional
attitudes, different social ecologies develop different norms for apt
emotions (19).
A key idea in Strawson is that the reactive attitudes are not only
essential to inter-personal relations, they are also essential to how
we see, judge, and regulate our own mind and behavior; they are
also intra-personal. I can experience, indeed I do experience, the
reactive attitudes to my own mental states and actions. Anger at
myself for what I did, as well as disappointment, pride, embarrass-
ment, shame, and guilt are familiar components of a human life.
Self-esteem is a general feeling that one is decent, worthy, doing
well; self-respect involves knowing with some degree of confidence
and proper humility that this feeling is warranted.
13Psychopaths or people with schizoid personality disorder might be exceptions to
Aristotle’s surmise.
14The straight rule is crude and says this: if I observe that A’s are B’s to m/n, then I
do/should infer that unobserved A’s are B’s to m/n.
Frontiers in Psychiatry | Addictive Disorders and Behavioral Dyscontrol October 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 120 | 6
Flanagan The shame of addiction
It is commonplace for modern people to think that ancient and
superficial peoples ran on shame whereas we run on guilt. Williams
(20) has turned this idea on its head. The idea that, for example,
the Greeks were a shame culture not a guilt culture is true but not
a weakness or superficial characteristic. Shame is not simply a feel-
ing caused by being seen, naked as it were, by others. It also involves
not passing one’s own survey. “Shame looks to what I am” [(20),
p. 92]. Guilt, the modern emotion, is the narrow reactive attitude.
It is largely internalized anger at certain actions and its roots are
in what Williams calls “morality, the peculiar institution.” Moral-
ity, the peculiar institution, is the narrow normative domain that
encompasses all and only the domains that the God of Abraham
is interested in assessing each person on come Judgment Day (its
secular version comes in Kant). Ethics, in the broad sense, prized
by the Greeks, by Nietzsche, and by Williams, is concerned with
living a good human life more generally. It involves aspirations to
flourish, which involves living at the intersections of what is good,
true, and beautiful, whereas modern moral philosophy focuses
primarily on the good, and even there it is narrowly conceived.
Here is how this relates to addiction. Almost all addicts expe-
rience failures of basic agent capacities, for example, in the first
criteria of DSM 5 there is a failure to do what one reflectively
intends. The non-addict will get that the addict might fail if a drink
or drug is right in front of her (we relate from chocolate candy type
experiences). But the addict will decide, indeed she will resolve not
to purchase alcohol or cocaine and then find herself driving to the
liquor store or crack house. This is shameful and is experienced as
such both on the way to score, although in something of a blur, and
afterward. I am ashamed of who I am, not simply for what I did.
And it builds. An addict is someone, who like everyone else, has
educational, career, and inter-personal aspirations, and he reliably
fails to achieve them; or he achieves them to some degree, and then
his addiction undermines these accomplishments. Every alcoholic
and every addict in rooms of AA and NA and most every memoir
of addiction (even if the author is not inculcated into 12-step ways
of speaking) will speak of extreme feelings of shame for who one
is, who one has become in one’s own eyes, even if one has not yet
been fully seen by others and even if objective failures are still in
the “not-yet” category (2, 13, 21)15.
The main point is that the ongoing epistemic-interpretative
failure that involves: (1) the inability to draw normal inferences
about the harms one is doing to oneself or others (caused by
various classical defense mechanisms); and (2) the inability to
get one’s mind, body, and behavior to respond to decisions and
resolutions in the normal ways; PLUS (3) the persistent failure
to live as one expects oneself to live as a worthy human being
undermine the basic goods of self-esteem and self-respect. One
is ashamed of who one is. The alcoholic needs to put the “plug
in the jug” (the crack addict needs to stop scoring eight balls; the
smack addict to put down the needle). But the disease of addiction
doesn’t end there and then. And the reason is simple. Addiction is
not a synchronic disorder that ends with the end of taking one’s
15The 12-step community speaks of addiction as a medical, psychological, and spir-
itual disease. Amazingly, the medical aspect was once thought to be or to involve an
allergy to alcohol. The psychological and spiritual aspects refer to a host of problems
in the self-esteem, self-respect, shame, and self-degradation arena.
DOC. It is a diachronic molar person-level disorder and as such
requires psychological, epistemic, moral, and narrative healing and
reconstruction.
SOCIAL CAPITAL
A consistent finding in the literature on human well-being is that
the best predictor of well-being – better that income, better than
health even – is social capital (22). Almost all the variance between
Northern Europeans and North Americans on the one hand, and
citizens of sub-Sahara Africa on the other hand, in well-being
measures has to do with the fact that almost half of informants
in sub-Sahara Africa say that if they fell off a bar stool (here used
only metaphorically), there would be no one they could count on
to help, not a friend, not their mother, father, brother, or sister.
In his important book, Bowling Alone, Putnam (23) plots some
of the causes and consequences of breakdowns in community
and loss of social capital in America. There are insights for those
concerned with addiction in these sorts of studies. First, addic-
tions increase when there is socio-economic displacement, break-
down in community, and the availability of drugs and alcohol.
Second, healing individuals typically involves reintegration into
community, often a community whose other members have also
experienced the bewildering twin normative failures and the self-
degradation that results, and who get, at a minimum, that this
sort of thing can happen to otherwise decent, worthy people, and
who have experience, strength, and hope to share about how to
regain control of one’s self, one’s life. Eventually, actually at the
same time, there is reintegration into the wider social community,
doing school or one’s job as one is supposed to, being there for one’s
friends and family in the way a good person is, an end to actual or
psychological isolation and concealment that is a common accom-
paniment of addiction (2, 13, 16, 21, 24, 25). Self-esteem and
self-respect return and shame dissipates, possibly pride grows.
RESPONSIBILITY “WITHOUT THE STING”
Strawson (18) writes about the possibility of taking “the objec-
tive attitude” toward certain persons. The objective attitude is
one that involves a surmise, possibly a conviction that the normal
reactive attitudes are not deserved in certain cases and should be
suspended. Children have temper tantrums and anger is not war-
ranted. So we suspend, or try not to act on anger, even if we can’t
help to feel it to some degree. We also can and do suspend or try
to suspend our normal reactions to the insane, to those who suffer
from compulsions, who have no rational control over their actions.
Can and should we take an objective attitude toward the addicts
in our midst? Probably. Can or should addicts take an objective
attitude toward themselves? Probably. But there are psychological
limits to our abilities to overcome natural dispositions. Further-
more, the addict feeling shame and the wider community thinking
it is a shame that his life is going so badly is a humane reaction. It
need not be taken to warrant blame. It signals that both the addict
and we recognize that he could do better and be better. Under-
standing that he is an addict is a humane way of saying that we get
that he is in a terrible fix and that we sympathize (46–48).
The more we learn about the complex socio-psycho-biological
nature of addiction, about the ways various cultures encourage
heavy drinking, about the effects of SES and drug availability,
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about genetic propensities, about the effects of weird reinforce-
ment regimens, and of brain glitches, we have reason to adjust
full normal subjective engagement to the addict. Williams makes
this interesting point: “What arouses guilt in an agent is an act or
omission of the sort that typically elicits from other people anger,
resentment, or indignation. What the agent may offer in order to
turn this away is reparation; he may also fear punishment or may
inflict it on himself. What arouses shame, on the other hand, is
something that typically elicits from others contempt or derision
or avoidance” [(20), pp. 89–90]. This seems right; the life of the
addict is a source of both guilt and shame. And thus he receives an
odd admixture of reactions from others; in part, there are the nor-
mal reactive attitudes that full blown autonomous agents receive,
anger and indignation; but there is also something else, a set of
reactions that indicate that you have put me – us – off. You are
puzzling, weird, to be avoided16.
Williams goes on: “His (the person who is ashamed) reaction is
a wish to hide or disappear, and this is one thing that links shame
as, minimally, embarrassment with shame as social or personal
reduction. More positively, shame may be expressed in attempts
to reconstruct or improve oneself” [(20), p. 90].
CONCLUSION
All this seems about right. And in particular: shame is partly con-
stitutive of addiction. The addict cannot pass his own survey. He
is appalled by the twin normative failures from which he suffers,
and shame is the appropriate, respectful, humane, first-person
response to these failures. Shame begets using and more using
begets more shame, and the vicious cycle is produced and main-
tains itself. Overcoming shame is part of overcoming addiction.
Shame is also normally a crucial factor motivating the addict’s
attempt to reclaim, reconstruct, and improve himself. It motivates
the addict to want to get a grip. That said, there are many rea-
sons for the addict to forgive himself and engage in the difficult
project of reconstruction and improvement with the knowledge
that his agentic capacities in relation to the Substance are compro-
mised, deficient; and, at the same time and for the same reasons,
there are reasons for others to keep the addict in the realm of the
very usual, the puzzling, the not-so-nice-to-be-around, but to also
engage him with sympathy and compassion, maybe with forgive-
ness. The more we know about addiction the more this becomes
both possible and sensible. At the same time, both the addict and
the community that is asked to understand and treat him with
compassion need to acknowledge that the addict is a person who
suffers twin normative failure. He will need to heal to once again
be treated as a full-fledged normal agent. He must regain his full
normative agency and regain traction in his quest to live well.
FOUR OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES
THE WILLING ADDICT OBJECTION
The process or condition that you are calling addiction really
includes matters characteristic of a certain kind of addict, a so-
called unwilling addict. Some addicts, however, are willing, and
16Pickard (25) argues that for individuals with both addictions and personality dis-
orders, we can and should decouple (1) Holding a person responsible for what she
did; (2) Holding her responsible for her future actions; (3) Blaming a person for
failures on 1 or 2.
do not feel shame or guilt over their addictive behavior patterns
(26). Willing addicts don’t double back on themselves and wish
that their behavior was otherwise or that they should control their
impulses to consume. Pickard (25) offers a powerful version of
this objection in correspondence. Based on her clinical experience
and standard DSM understanding, she writes that among addicts
“are some people who are severely personality disordered, really
genuinely don’t want people or friends in their lives (this is part of
having schizoid PD, diagnostically) and have a ‘relationship’ with
drugs instead; some are so narcissistic and grandiose that the claim
that they feel shame or look on their lives critically or think they
could do wrong would require very deep, very inaccessible levels
of the unconscious to make it true.”
The objection is that there are certain individuals with schizoid
personality disorder, perhaps there are others in the manic phase
of bipolar disorder, who are addicts in the sense that they have lost
rational effective control over using, but do not feel shame, and
thus do not suffer the twin failures and who thus are not, according
to me, addicts. But they really are addicts. So the twin normative
criterion is descriptively false.
Before I respond to the objection, I can strengthen it as an
objection, by pointing to two recent memoirs where the protago-
nists might be addicts in the sense of satisfying condition no. 1 of
the twin normative failure model – he can’t stop if or insofar as he
tries – but he doesn’t feel shame.Narcopolis by Thayil (27) andThe
Wet and the Dry by Osborne (28) brilliantly present two different
types of character who don’t seem to satisfy the shame condition.
In Thayil’s semi-fictional memoir, the 1970s opium dens of Mum-
bai, then known as Bombay, are a romantic haven for souls who
have almost no other options, plus opium is really cheap. He and
they are addicted and they don’t give a shit. Even if Thayil is not
proud to be an addict, he is not ashamed either. Osborne’s story
meanwhile is a hilarious romp through the Middle East by a man
who is a “drinker” and who is hoping that laws and social mores
of Muslim countries that disapprove of drinking will help him at
least temporarily to moderate. They don’t and he doesn’t.
So now the strengthened objection is this: there are at least four
types of addicts that do not satisfy the shame condition: (1) people
with personality disorders such as schizoid PD; (2) people in full
blown mania; (3) people that have easy access to the Substance, to
their DOC, and no other choice-worthy options are available [see
Ref. (29, 30)]; (4) “Drinkers,” like Osborne – also think of Richard
Burton, Richard Harris, Peter O’Toole, and Christopher Hitchens
or a heroin user with resources to get reliably pure doses, a Keith
Richards type. This latter may be an approved of life style among
a certain mostly white elite in the UK, but probably not in the US.
Reply
No doubt cases of addiction are heterogeneous in many respects,
and dimensional in depth, severity, and so on. Are there willing
addicts?17 Surely, there are people who minimize and rationalize,
17Kennett (41) helpfully distinguishes four possible kinds of addicts: willing; unwill-
ing; wanton; and resigned. She is skeptical about willing addicts. Wanton addicts, if
there are any, are not reflective in ways that would allow noticing the twin normative
failures or perhaps if they did, caring about them. Mice addicts are wanton addicts. I
doubt that there are any person addicts who fit the bill since even wantons will need
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and people who think they could stop if they decided to do so.
Some of these probably do fall into the class of willing users, even
willing abusers. They choose to use, but believe they could stop
if they had sufficient reason to do so. They like using excessively,
asocially, possibly even antisocially. Some of these people might
be wrong that they could stop if they tried (in the normal reason-
responsive way), in which case they would be wrong that they are
not addicts because they do not satisfy the first normative condi-
tion, the effective agency condition. They do; they just don’t know
that they do. The Big Book of AA says if you think you are not an
alcoholic, you may be right. There is a test: try some controlled
drinking and if you can do so reliably and without always feeling
overwhelming desire to use, then you were right – you were just a
heavy drinker not an alcoholic. On my view, if a person could stop
if they decide to do so, they do not suffer the first normative failure
of effective agency (nor would they be self-deceived,etc.). And such
an individual would not be an addict according to the view on offer.
But what about the memoir cases and Pickard’s psychiatric
case(s)? One thing to say about the two memoir cases is that in
both cases some shame is experienced; Osborne, at least, is often
embarrassed about the blackouts and some of the predicaments
his drinking gets him in. The shame condition in the twin norma-
tive failure model does not specify how much shame needs to be
experienced. This could also be said of people with bipolar disor-
der when they are not in the grandiose bullet-proof phase, during
which down-times they do backtrack, second-guess, and so on.
But this doesn’t solve the problems with the Pickard case
of schizoid personality disorder where no shame is experienced
diachronically; where possibly there is pride instead. A response
specifically to these cases might distinguish addicts who satisfy the
first condition (call them addicts type-1) and those who satisfy
both (addicts type-2). Another is to claim that even the people
who don’t feel shame ought to, which concedes that the crite-
rion is normative not descriptive. The option I am inclined to
take is to restrict the twin normative failure model to people who
do not have severe personality disorders (e.g., schizoid PD) and
people who are not in the grandiose phases of bipolar disorder.
This would still leave the model open to this objection: there are
social environments that are so degraded that there is no shame
in addiction descriptively – perhaps the addicts are literally and
rightly hopeless – and in which shame, guilt, blame are normatively
unwarranted. Shamelessly addicted is simply the way some people
live. I accept this. In such environments the concept of addiction
in my sense has at best only a weak grip, only the first condition of
to schedule desires and trying to do so will result in recognition of their inability
to successfully schedule substance-related desires (unless supply is unlimited), and
thus in recognition and bewilderment over their control capacities. This much will
lead, even the amoralist, to frustration and anger at his failure to live as he wishes,
to coordinate demand/need to supply, and to gain the satisfactions he seeks. There
probably are resigned or hopeless addicts, but even they will normally experience
themselves, and will be seen by others as suffering the twin normative failures of loss
of effective agency and life standard failure, although the space of live options for
such resigned individuals will have pretty much closed off. Resignation is normally
a sad emotion constituted in part by the sense that things could have gone bet-
ter. When an environment is really objectively hopeless, offering no decent options
for a good human life, then there just may be no norms against which the addicts
life is better or worse than any other. I accept that in such environments, the twin
normative failure model starts to lose its grip; perhaps, it is irrelevant.
addiction would be met, and even that only in a weak sense: if the
resigned or hopeless addicts in such worlds wanted to stop (they
don’t), they couldn’t18. The twin normative failure model is a use-
ful model in environments where there are multiple choice-worthy
options, not otherwise.
THE ESSENCE AND THE PERIPHERY OBJECTION
The twin normative failure model of addiction is swollen and
inflated. There is too much that you are including as proper parts
of addiction or of an addictive behavior pattern. The essence of
addiction is at the brain level. The presence or absence of shame
and negative self-evaluative attitudes, of various moral attitudes
and emotions, the failures of reason responsiveness are sequelae
of addiction, not part of addiction.
Reply
First, if an essence involves characterizing the set of properties that
are invariant or at least highly reliable accompaniments of a kind,
then the two normative failure model has at least as much credibil-
ity as any other model. I claim that you will find evidence of both
normative failures in most every addict’s first personal testimony
and in the third personal testimony of professionals who work
with addicts. The shame of addiction is shame that is directed to
the content that [I cannot control my behavior in relation to the
Substance] and that [because of my using the Substance I fail to
live up to my ends, values, goals, and standards]. Those who favor
only brain or genetic bases for the disease have yet to agree about
what that single basis is, if there is one, or whether it is polyneural
or polygenic, if there are several, and how exactly (and when) con-
firmation/disconfirmation might come for the various contender
hypotheses. I claim that there is confirmation for the twin nor-
mative failure model right now. Second, although a less inclusive
or thinner concept of addiction (a least common denominator
conception, as it were) may work as an operational stipulation in
the case of models of certain non-human animal behavior, it is
without merit in the richer conceptual and normative world of
human beings, at the person level. Third, and relatedly, the objec-
tion favors an unrealistic simplifying assumption requiring that
we define the dysfunction of addiction synchronically rather than
diachronically, and over some aspect that is hypothesized, but not
yet shown to obtain over all creatures that can suffer addiction.
But claiming that the hypothesized shared basis is the essence, and
that all other features, especially ones that reliably appear in Homo
sapiens are not, is to change the question. Fourth, the method
of gaining insight into essences is unstable. We have already seen
how some geneticists think they can reduce the neuroscientific
base of addiction to a genetic one in DNA, and even RNA, that
serve the salt or water instincts (31) 19. For familiar reasons, this
18These sad cases are “resigned addicts” (41). It needn’t be that a whole social world
has no choice-worthy options; it can be that certain social groups are trapped by
racism or sexism or terrible poverty to have no or very limited choice-worthy options
in a world where there are abundant options for others.
19To be fair, since full blown reduction never occurs, the geneticist should not claim
reduction, but something like the further specification of mechanisms at the lower
level (genes) that explain partly why the brain is doing what it is doing. Similar
humility on the part of those who work on the neuroscience of addiction would
claim to provide insight into some of the mechanisms involved in addiction.
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move opens the geneticists’ account to a further reduction into the
language of bosons and fermions or whatever is the language of
fundamental physics. With each reduction we move further and
further from the phenomenon we started and are providing a less
ecologically valid account of that phenomenon. If we are speaking
of addiction among humans and addiction constitutes any sort
of well-behaved or unified kind, every bit of evidence indicates
that it is a psychological or behavioral kind that is also a double-
normed social kind. This is perfectly compatible with this kind
also having certain common features at the level of the brain and
genes since kinds defined at the higher level have all the proper-
ties that the lower levels have but the reserve is not true, and this
matters.
THE INTERVENTION OBJECTION
The key to curing addiction is to arrest it, to stop the addict from
using. Your view says that addicts fail to be able to exert normal
self-control capacities and are ashamed of both this fact and the
fact that they are failing to live a good human life. But you also
acknowledge that knowing or experiencing this and also desiring
to stop is normally not enough to stop. For this we are work-
ing toward pharmacological interventions that help addicts stop
using, which is a necessary condition for any and all further heal-
ing. There are drugs that make the alcoholic sick if she uses, and
others that mitigate the effects of cocaine and opiates. Eventually,
work in genetics will yield simple interventions that adjust genes
for those predisposed, and so on. If you think these interventions
are already working, or might work, to arrest addiction, then you
acknowledge that brain or genes cause of addiction.
Reply
The first part of the objection is not an objection to the view. I
have said exactly nothing about opposing any and all therapeu-
tic techniques that are helpful to the addict. If various kinds of
psychopharmacological interventions can help without compara-
ble costs, then, good, use them. But do not make the mistake of
thinking that in locating an intervention site that one has identi-
fied the cause. Also beware the related mistake (sometimes made
by psychoanalysis) that the root cause must be treated to arrest an
ailment. First, many things are fixed without fixing what caused
the breakdown. The weather caused the bicycle chain to rust. I
clean the chain and oil it. I fix the bike but have done nothing to
the weather. On the other side, we need to beware mono-causal
thinking. The pragmatics of causal talk makes it sensible to say
such things as the rock broke the window. But really the rock
only broke the window because it, the window, had a certain
density and brittleness (if it had been shatterproof, no break-
age). And the window broke only because the boy threw the rock,
and he threw it only because he was angry, and so on. No rock,
no broken window; no angry boy, no broken window. The best
analysis of causation in the philosophy of science says that the
total cause of Θ is the set of events and processes (α, β, γ, δ . . .
ω) such that if (counterfactually) anyone of them were differ-
ent Θ would not have occurred as it is (32). And so it is with
addiction. Take away the family that thinks adult drunkenness
or drug use is amusing and some “addicts” never become one,
take away the hopelessness of some urban environments and the
rate of addiction will go down, and so on for genetic predispo-
sitions, etc. The first point is that many interventions do treat
or require treating causes, and in so far as it is wise to treat a
cause (or constituent or effect) of some disorder, and such inter-
vention is effective, this should be applauded. But it is not at the
same time any evidence at all that the cause has been found. It is
rare for any phenomena that there is any such thing as the cause.
Genes are causal factors in addiction, brains are causal factors, and
families are causal factors. But invariably using a fair amount of
some substance is a causal contributor to addiction, and this social
practice – drinking, snorting, and mainlining – is not in the genes
or the head.
OBJECTION: RE-MORALIZING ADDICTION
Fourth and finally, it will be objected that the appeal to the shame
of addiction reintroduces the idea that addiction is a moral failing.
Reply
This is a simplistic and mistaken objection. Addiction is a nor-
mative disorder, a twin normative disorder that involves shame
at one’s own survey, first because one is not an effective agent in
relation to the Substance and cannot reliably do what one judges
best, and second, because one is messing up one’s life because of
one’s relation to the Substance. These are normal responses by
the addict to his own realistic assessment of his plight. It is an
interesting and important question whether an addict can take
or adopt an “objective attitude” toward himself. It seems often
to occur to some imperfect extent, and insofar as it does hap-
pen it may well prepare the person for self-forgiveness, and for
reclamation of self-esteem and self-respect. There can be shame
without blame. We acknowledge this when we say of the addict
or the way he lives that “it” is “a shame.” Or to put the matter
another way: guilt is anger turned inward and normally involves
blame. Shame involves disappointment at self, but need not involve
anger at self. Anger can immobilize; but shame can and often does
motivate a change in direction, a search for a way to overcome
his extraordinarily destructive relation to the Substance. As for
others, knowledge is power, and the more that is know about the
nature, causes, and multifarious trajectories of addiction, the more
reasons others have to treat addicts as special cases, not as suffer-
ing an ordinary physical disease, but also not as fully effective
agents, as worthy of sympathy and compassion because they suf-
fer the shame of addiction. My recommendation is to accept that
addiction just is a normative disorder, while at the same time not
moralizing it.
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